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Point de Vue 
If the British left: Agricultural policy outside the CAP? 
Alan Swinbank 
Revised April 2014 
 
The United Kingdom’s troubled relationship with the EU has entered new, 
uncharted, waters. Britain’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, faced with major 
unease among the Conservative Party’s MPs in the House of Commons, and 
amongst ordinary members of his party, has been forced to concede that — were 
the Conservatives to win an outright majority in the General Election due in 
2015 — then he would seek to ‘negotiate a new settlement with our European 
partners … . And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the 
British people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. To stay in the EU 
on these new terms; or come out altogether’ (Cameron, 2013). Opinion polls 
suggest that a narrow majority of the British public would — if asked today — 
vote to leave. A recent poll of 1,662 likely voters suggested that 52 per cent could 
so vote, whilst 34 per cent were more likely to want to remain (see Figure 1), 
reflecting earlier polling results by the same group (Opinium Research, 2013) 
 
Figure 1: Voting intentions, mid-January 2014 
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Response to the Question: If a referendum were held on the UK’s membership of the European 
Union with the options being to remain a member or withdraw, how do you think you would vote? 
14-16 January 2014. 1 per cent of the sample did not respond. Source: Opinium Research: 
http://news.opinium.co.uk/survey-results/political-polling-14th-january-2014, last accessed 7 
February 2014. 
 
It is not entirely clear (to this author at least) what the respondents 
thought their options were. What is the counter factual to continued 
membership of the EU? What are the feasible alternatives? It might be argued 
that the country faced a similar dilemma in June 1975 when Harold Wilson’s 
Labour Government asked the public: ‘Do you think that the United Kingdom 
should stay in the European Community (The Common Market)?’; and 17 million 
voted Yes whilst 8 million said No (Butler & Kitzinger, 1996: 61, 1). But this was 
only the third year of membership and the full transition period had not been 
completed; GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) rules were not 
particularly binding; and so it was not difficult to envisage a simple re-winding of 
arrangements, and a return to the previous status quo. The Anti-Marketeers’ 
leaflet went further, however, suggesting that the UK, resuming its membership 
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), would be able to ‘enjoy free entry 
for … industrial exports into the Common Market without having to carry the 
burden of the Market’s dear food policy or suffer rule from Brussels’ (op. cit.: 304). 
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Forty years on the situation is rather different. A return to a pre-1973 set 
of policies seems hardly feasible. World Trade Organization (WTO) rules are 
more exacting than the GATT provisions they updated in 1995. If the British 
public is to have the ‘real choice between leaving or being part of a new 
settlement’ that David Cameron has offered, then the alternatives will need 
spelling out — even if the Government ends up recommending continued 
membership, as Harold Wilson did in 1975. And if the British public were to vote 
No, the Government of the day would need to implement its alternative strategy 
(Plan B): the UK exiting the EU (or possibly a rump-UK, should Scotland vote for 
independence in September 2014). 
We do not yet know what the euro-sceptics want to renegotiate, but the 
budget, migration from other EU states, and social legislation, loom large 
amongst their complaints. Whether the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) will 
appear on the list, as it did in 1975, remains to be seen. 
But if the UK were to exit the EU, what would British agricultural policy 
look like? What would replace the CAP? As the past president of the National 
Farmers’ Union recently remarked, ‘there has been no serious attempt to explain 
what an independent British agricultural policy would look like’ (Kendall, 2013). 
 
Greener, and reduced, support? 
One possibility would be to swap EU legislation on market price support, direct 
payments with their cross compliance and greening provisions, and the rural 
development measures, with British legislation having exactly the same effect. 
But is that a likely outcome? 
 Successive British governments have repeatedly argued for more radical 
reform of the CAP than the EU has been willing to accept. For example, in June 
2011, as the debate over the shape of the post-2013 CAP got underway, the UK 
Government (2011: 5) said:  
‘We believe there should be a very substantial cut to the CAP budget …, 
concentrated on Pillar 1’s direct payments. Future EU expenditure must be 
prioritised wisely to ensure that we are properly preparing for the long-term, 
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providing best value for taxpayers money. For example, expenditure in a 
significantly smaller CAP should be targeted at the key objectives of encouraging 
a competitive, sustainable EU agriculture sector, helping to reduce farmer 
reliance on subsidies and preparing them for a very different future. In future, 
CAP expenditure should be increasingly focused on the provision of 
environmental public goods. Pillar 2 should therefore represent a greater share 
of a smaller CAP budget.’ 
 
To what extent these aspirations would translate into a reduction of 
support to British farmers, and a greater emphasis on the provision of 
environmental public goods, should the UK exit the EU is open to question. For 
the farming community the political acceptability of reduced Pillar 1 payments 
would depend in part upon the trade regime in place. In particular, if borders 
with the EU remained open, British farmers might bitterly complain that they 
faced an uneven playing field as their competitors were better able to remain in 
business as a result of more generous Pillar 1 payments subsidising their 
farming activities. 
 
Trade Policy? 
It seems likely that the UK, as a member of the WTO in its own right, would 
simply adopt the EU’s most-favoured-nation (mfn) tariff barriers, and its trade 
regime for the least-developed countries (LDCs). Unilaterally it could then 
reduce its mfn tariffs if it wished. More problematic would be the web of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) that the EU has with many non-LDCs around the world. 
Unless the UK had negotiated new RTAs with these countries, I do not see how 
the UK could continue with the EU’s tariff preferences. Brazil would surely 
protest if the UK offered tariff concessions on raw sugar as if it were still 
applying the EU’s Economic Partnership Agreements for example. Nor would the 
UK be party to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership currently 
being negotiated with the USA. 
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WTO rules also imply that an independent UK would have to apply its mfn 
trade regime to its erstwhile partners in the EU — including, potentially, an 
independent Scotland — unless it had already negotiated with them a valid RTA. 
Would this be the Government’s Plan B; and would the rest of the EU be willing 
to enter into such an agreement if it did not include all of the four ‘freedoms’ of 
movement of goods, capital, services, and persons? This, after all, is the basic 
premise of the European Economic Area (EEA) covering three EFTA States and 
the EU (EFTA, 2014). Moreover, in order for this new trading arrangement to be 
offered as an option to the British public at the referendum, it would need to be 
negotiated in parallel with the Government’s renegotiation of the terms of 
membership. 
 
The CAP? 
It is not only the UK that would need to adjust. In addition to the trade issues 
touched on above — Irish beef facing the same trade barriers as Brazilian beef in 
the British market for example — a British withdrawal could for example trigger 
a funding crisis in the EU. In 2012 Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget — 
after allowing for the British rebate — was €9.2 billion. This was equivalent to 
17 per cent of expenditure in the other Member States on Budget Heading 2 
(Natural Resources: which is predominantly the CAP) (European Commission, 
2013: Annex 2c). A budget shortfall of this magnitude would be unprecedented, 
and there is little to suggest how the EU would react. One possibility, in line with 
past practice, would be to protect the CAP’s budget for direct payments whilst 
either slashing expenditure elsewhere or raising Member State contributions. 
 
Unintended consequences 
The outcome of the 2015 General Election is by no means certain. A 
renegotiation of the terms of membership might result in radical changes that 
would assuage much of the euro-scepticism currently pervading British public 
opinion. Faced with an in-out vote the British public might well decide they 
prefer the status quo, as they did in 1975. But if they really are to choose in an in-
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out referendum then they need to know what the possible alternatives are. 
Moreover it is only when feasible alternatives have been set out that analysts 
and modellers can assess the likely consequences, and that competing claims can 
be rationally debated.  
But it is not enough to suggest what the alternatives might be.  A 
Government that rashly promises renegotiation and an in-out referendum really 
has to have Plan B in place should the public decide they want to quit. And the 
only way the Government can be sure Plan B is available is to embark upon twin 
negotiations for alternative settlements: a reconfigured EU, and the UK’s exit. 
Even so, Plan A is not problem free. If politicians can avoid holding the promised 
referendum, or if an In vote can be secured, will that turn euro-sceptic Brits into 
enthusiastic EU citizens? I doubt it: but then that is true of some other EU states 
as well! And I suspect that the CAP would continue to be a source of controversy. 
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Summary: If the Conservative party wins Britain’s General Election in 2015 the 
incoming Government intends to negotiate a new settlement with the EU, and 
then hold an in-out referendum. Opinion polls suggest a narrow majority would 
vote to leave. To exercise an informed choice the electorate would need to know 
what feasible alternatives are available, so that these can be assessed and 
debated. Furthermore, in the event of a no vote the Government must be ready to 
implement its alternative strategy: Plan B. This implies that both a new EU 
settlement, and Plan B, need to be negotiated concurrently. There has been no 
serious attempt to explain what Plan B would mean for UK farm policy. Would, 
for example, British farmers continue to receive the level of support that they 
currently enjoy; would support be more focussed on environmental objectives? 
WTO rules on most-favoured-nation treatment and regional trade agreements 
would apply. Could a WTO compatible agri-food trade agreement be negotiated 
with its former EU partners, or would Irish and Brazilian beef face the same tariff 
barriers on imports into the British market? For the EU, the loss of a major net 
contributor to EU finances could result in a re-examination of the CAP budget.  
 
Pullquote: “If the British public is to have a ‘real choice between leaving or being 
part of a new settlement’, then the alternatives will need spelling out” 
